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Consider two candidates for president. Candidate A while in office has engaged in 
questionable financial dealings and consorted with criminal types, but is an exemplary 
family man. Candidate B has had several extra marital affairs, but his financial record is 
above reproach. Whom should voters choose?   
  Recent candidates may come to mind, but the question actually refers to the 1884 
presidential election—the contest between Grover Cleveland and James Blaine. Blaine had 
corruptly profited from public office but lived an impeccable private life. Cleveland had a 
reputation for public integrity, but had been forced to acknowledge fathering an illegitimate 
child. Here is what one of Cleveland’s supporters said in the campaign: 
  
I gather that Mr. Cleveland has shown high character and great capacity in public 
office, but that in private life his conduct has been open to question, while, on the 
other hand, Mr. Blaine, in public life has been weak and dishonest, while he seems 
to have been an admirable husband and father. The conclusion that I draw from 
these facts is that we should elect Mr. Cleveland to the public office which he is so 
admirably qualified to fill and remand Mr. Blaine to the private life which he is so 
eminently fitted to adorn (Howe 1932, p. 151).   2 
 
The separation between private and public life may not be as sharp as Cleveland’s 
supporter implies. Some kinds of otherwise private immoralities can affect public 
responsibilities. How we should draw the line between the public and private for officials 
can be a quite complex question (Thompson 2005, 227-242).  But for the purposes of 
addressing the question of the qualities we should want in a president, the main implication 
of this and similar examples is that ethical virtues do not always go together. It is quite 
possible to be moral in public but not in private, and vice versa. Most of the leading 
conspirators in the Watergate scandal led impeccable private lives. And some presidents 
who are regarded as ethical leaders were not moral exemplars in their personal relations. 
FDR’s wartime leadership and his extramarital affairs illustrate the contrast clearly. To 
generalize the point: ethical character is fragmented. The classic ideal of the unity of virtue 
is neither psychologically plausible nor ethically necessary. Presidents like the rest of us can 
have some virtues without having all the others. 
Not only can individuals have some without having the others, they can display the 
very same virtue in some situations but not in others. A long line of research in social 
psychology (beginning with unreliable school children and continuing with insensitive 
seminarians) has generally supported what is now called situationism (Doris 2002; but see 
Sabini and Silver 2005).  Small and seemingly irrelevant differences in the situation (such as 
whether you are late for a meeting) may make all the difference in whether you act morally. 
If moral character is so variable and so mixed, we should be prepared to tolerate some 
vices in our presidents, and be more discriminating in the virtues we require of them. Some 
vices may be less serious in public office, and some virtues more essential than in private 
life. We may of course aspire to have a president who has all the virtues, public and private,   3 
or as many as possible, but we should recognize that we have to decide which are more 
important. We should develop a better sense of the priorities of the virtues than is 
commonly displayed in the media and popular comment on presidents.  
Which virtues should have priority? The virtues we should care most about—those 
that we should  require rather than just hope for—are the qualities that make up what may 
be called constitutional character. This refers to the disposition to act, and motivate others 
to act, according to the principles that constitute the democratic process. No doubt there 
are many personal qualities that would help a president use the process well— for 
example, courage, compassion, loyalty, constancy, though even some of these take a 
different form in public than in private life. Loyalty to friends can turn into a vice in 
governing. Constancy may save a president from the charge of flip-flopping, but (as I 
explain below) at the cost of failing to respond opportunely to changed circumstances.  
 Constitutional virtues are distinctive: they are specific to public office, either 
because they take a different form in public life or because the occasion for their exercise 
does not arise in private life. Because the democratic process assigns different 
responsibilities to different offices, the constitutional virtues needed in a president may differ 
from those desirable in a member of congress or the Supreme Court.  But the most 
important virtues can be described quite generally. They include sensitivity to basic rights of 
citizenship, a respect for due process in the broadest sense, the sense of responsibility, 
tolerance of opposition, willingness to justify decisions, and above all the commitment to 
candor.  
Although the ideal leader would manifest all of these virtues, constitutional character 
is often fragmented like other forms of character.  A president may respect basic rights but 
not due process, or may have a strong sense of responsibility but little tolerance for   4 
opposition. Some constitutional virtues probably go more naturally together: it would be 
difficult to display a sense of responsibility without be willing to justify decisions.  And 
without an ultimate commitment to candor, as will be emphasized below, the other virtues 
cannot be fully known and genuinely practiced.   
Defending these virtues and criticizing their corresponding vices does not imply that 
character is more fundamental than actions or consequences in political ethics. 
Constitutional character does not require that we make virtue foundational in our ethical 
theory. The qualities of character discussed here must ultimately be assessed by 
considering the actions of the leaders who possess them and the consequences that 
follow the decisions they make. The nature of each virtue can be best brought out by 
describing the corresponding vice, which is if not the more common than the more 
conspicuous of the pair. 
 
Sensitivity to Rights 
In this era of rising concern about national security, we should not be surprised that 
presidents are tempted to violate basic rights. We may not even know when they have 
authorized or permitted their subordinates to carry out actions that invade privacy, deny 
legal access, abuse prisoners, and other clandestine wrongs. In the absence of timely 
knowledge of actions, we have to rely on dispositions. We want a president who is 
sensitive to rights even when acting in secret.  
A good test of whether a president has this disposition is how he deals with rights 
in public.  This may give some indication of how he would act in private. But presidents 
know that other leaders (in Congress, the judiciary and civil society) are likely to challenge 
public violations that affect large numbers of citizens, especially those with political   5 
influence. The respect for rights in public may weaken when they can act in secret.  A 
better test is how the president treats the more vulnerable citizens, those who are seen as 
different or marginal and those who do not yet have all the rights of citizenship. The political 
pressure to respect their rights is usually weaker and sometimes even negative, and the 
influence of the disposition or its absence is therefore more pronounced.  
On this test, even some of the most fair-minded presidents did not always do so 
well. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, FDR ordered the forcible removal and internment of 
more than 100,000 people of Japanese ancestry to “War Relocation Camps.” Some 60 per 
cent were U.S. citizens. Not until 1988 did the U.S. government officially acknowledge that 
this order was wrong. Reagan signed legislation that stated that government actions were 
based on “race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership” (100th 
Congress, S. 1009). Reparations did not come until 1999. It is of course easier to 
recognize a violation of rights after the threat of war has passed and when the wrongs can 
be attributed to an earlier regime (and opposing party). Nevertheless, Reagan (and the 
Congress of his time) showed at least a symbolic concern for rights and put future 
presidents on notice that respect for rights is a necessary part of constitutional character.  
Not only action but also inaction can show a disregard for rights. The failure to 
speak out against the violation of basic rights is another sign of the lack of this virtue. 
According to one of his most sympathetic biographers, Eisenhower provided “almost no 
leadership at all” on “one of the great moral issues of the day, the struggle to eliminate 
racial segregation from American life. …His failure to speak out, to indicate personal 
approval of (the 1954 Supreme Court decision to force integration in the schools), did 
incalculable harm to the civil-rights crusade and to America’s image” (Ambrose 1984). 
Many other historians and journalists have portrayed Eisenhower’s role on this issue in the   6 
same way, but a more recent study, sharply critical of the conventional view, emphasizes 
the many significant actions he took toward protecting the civil rights of African-Americans 
(Nichols 2007).  Eisenhower’s rhetorical deficiencies, this author suggests, may have 
obscured his  substantial contributions. In this case, it seems that words spoke louder than 
actions. Speaking out may thus be a necessary component of the virtue of respect for 
rights.   
Those who do not yet have full rights, and those who seem different from us, are 
often no official’s influential constituents, and no official’s important cause. A president who 
shows sensitivity to their plight, who challenges threats to their fundamental rights of 
citizenship, displays a trait essential to constitutional character. If a president respects their 
rights, we can have some reason to believe that he will respect ours even if he could get 
away with violating them.  
 
Respect for Due Process 
“Energy in the executive,” Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 70, “is a leading character in the 
definition of good government.” The constitution and the law give the presidency plenty of 
sources for that energy, and presidents have not been shy about exploiting them for good 
or for ill.  As the presidency has grown more energetic, presidents have become bolder in 
pursuing their ends with means that may formally follow the constitution but flout its spirit. 
The temptation to expand executive power beyond its just limits is most obvious in 
struggles between the president and congress. To be sure, we want a strong leader, but 
one who respects due process in the broadest sense—who respects constitutional 
balance and recognizes the authority and value of the legislative branch even when it 
thwarts his will.    7 
One instrument of presidential power that is perfectly constitutional but easily 
subject to abuse is the executive order, a directive issued to officers under the president’s 
authority. Most orders are routine but some can result in far-reaching change (Mayer 2002; 
and Howell 2003). The effects can be deplorable as in the case of FDR’s internment order. 
But they can be admirable as in the case of Truman’s decision to desegregate the armed 
forces. An order is constitutional if it is under a law but not if the order itself makes law.  
(Truman’s seizure of the steel mills was overturned because it was not implementing any 
specific law.) The distinction between making and implementing law is obviously fuzzy, and 
presidents who care more for their policies than the constitutional process are prone to 
ignore it.   
A similar disregard can be seen in the abuse of signing statements, the formal 
declarations that presidents attach to legislation  (“Symposium” 2007; and Lee 2008).  
Sometimes these are perfectly appropriate. The president may attach qualifications that fill 
gaps where congress was silent. Arguably, he may use the statements to express his own 
views about the constitutionality of the law.  But in recent years signing statement have 
been used more frequently, and often with the intent of undermining the legislation. Several 
of Clinton’s signing statements came close to challenging the law he was signing, and 
many of Bush’s have been plausibly interpreted as declaring that the president will not 
enforce the law being enacted. A president with a stronger constitutional character would 
find more forthright ways to challenge the law. 
Yet another distinction that is regrettably easy for an energetic president to ignore 
concerns the power of appointment. Presidents certainly should be able to appoint high 
level officials who are faithfully committed to carrying out their policies. But except for their 
close political advisers, they should not make personnel decisions on the basis of whether   8 
the officials will give the highest priority to the reelection of the party and president. The line 
between policy reliability and partisan loyalty is, like other practices that call for judgment, 
not sharp.  A due process disposition may be the only protection against stepping across a 
line that is inevitably blurry and often deliberately blurred. Evidently with the encouragement 
of Bush’s White House, the Attorney General and some of his staff ignored the line. They 
systematically flouted the tradition of nonpartisan appointments in the Justice Department 
by dismissing seven US attorneys in 2006. These dismissals surely violated political ethics 
and they may have violated the law as well. A due regard for the difference between policy 
making and partisanship is a necessary part of a respect for the kind of due process that 
constitutional character calls for.  
 
Sense of Responsibility 
“Mistakes were made” is one of the most common locutions in the rhetorical arsenal of 
presidents and other officials of government. It is a “passive-evasive way of acknowledging 
error while distancing the speaker from responsibility for it” (Safire 2008, p. 431). The “past 
exonerative tense,” as it has been dubbed, is a reliable sign of the absence of a sense of 
responsibility (Broder 2007). The  locution marks a long trail of responsibility evasions from 
Grant (“mistakes have been made, as all can see and I admit it,” referring to the scandals 
spreading through his administration in 1876) to Bush’s Attorney General (“mistakes were 
made” in the firing of the U.S. attorneys). So when mistakes are made, whether policy 
blunders or ethical transgressions by his subordinates, should a constitutionally virtuous 
president take responsibility for them?  
Presidents are of course not always personally responsible for many of the mistakes 
made or wrongs committed in their administration. In private life, individuals may be   9 
excused or at least not blamed as much for actions of others even if they could have 
prevented them. But in public life we should expect more: the sense of responsibility should 
expand as the powers of the office and the scope of its consequences expand. Like 
leaders of any large organization, presidents should be held accountable for the failures of 
their subordinates. This elementary principle of the democratic process has not escaped 
presidential notice, but the way in which presidents take notice of it shows no more 
constitutional character than the invocation of “mistakes were made.”   
In September 2005, shortly after Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans and 
large parts of the Gulf Coast, Bush announced: “To the extent the federal government 
didn’t fully do its job right, I take responsibility” (White House News Release 2005). Yet only 
a short time earlier he had praised his director of the office of emergency management (in 
the now notorious “You’re doing a heck of a job, Brownie”), allowed unnamed White House 
sources to pin most of the blame on state and local officials, and took no action against the 
principal cabinet officer in overall charge. Taking responsibility does not show a sense of 
responsibility if no consequences follow for those who take it. 
Taking responsibility becomes a kind of political ritual that has no negative effect on 
the president. Indeed, a president can often turn this ritual to their advantage. With regular 
incantations of “I accept full responsibility,” he strengthens his own political standing—by 
reassuring the public that someone is in charge and by projecting an image of a 
courageous leader who does not pass the buck (Thompson 2005, 11-32). Also, as he 
becomes known as a leader who takes the blame for subordinates, he gains gratitude and 
thus greater obedience from those subordinates in the future. Most significantly, the ritual 
often quells public debate about a controversial decision or policy, effectively blocking   10 
further inquiry into the genuine moral responsibility of all of the officials involved, especially 
that of the leader.  
After the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy privately blamed the 
CIA, the Joint Chiefs, and just about everyone who knew about the invasion in advance. 
But publicly he accepted the “sole responsibility” and objected to anyone’s “attempting to 
shift responsibility” away from him (Schlesinger 1965, 289-90). The ritual taking of 
responsibility in this case not only cut short public inquiry into other officials’ responsibility 
for the failure of the invasion, but more importantly, also forestalled public debate about 
each official’s failure to consider whether subversion of this kind is justified at all. It seems, 
furthermore, that the more personally blameworthy an official, the more strenuously the 
official is likely to insist on accepting this kind of faux responsibility. In the spring of 1973, as 
Watergate intruded more and more into the office of the president itself, Nixon invoked the 
ritualistic formula of responsibility in almost its pure form: 
 
Who is to blame for what happened in this case? . . . The easiest course would be 
for me to blame those to whom I delegated the responsibility to run the campaign. 
But that would be a cowardly thing to do. . . . In any organization, the man at the 
top must bear the responsibility. That responsibility, therefore, belongs here in this 
office. I accept it (transcribed from tape of CBS broadcast of Nixon’s address to the 
nation, April 30, 1973). 
 
  The norm of taking responsibility has a long tradition in the professional military. It 
has been codified as “command responsibility” in international law since the early part of 
the last century. The norm is also typically observed by British and European cabinet   11 
ministers when their policies go disastrously wrong, regardless of whether they, their 
subordinates or anyone is at fault. But translated into American political culture, the norm 
has lost its consequential sting. Unlike military commanders and parliamentary ministers, 
American officials do not assume that taking responsibility for major mistakes requires 
punishment or even resignation. (In Nixon’s case resignation came later and was forced.) 
Presidents thus reap the rhetorical advantages of taking responsibility without suffering the 
political sanctions that the full-bodied norm would impose.  
  Constitutional character seeks to revive at least part of that traditional sense of 
responsibility but without turning the norm into a rule of strict liability.  The sense of 
responsibility properly understood is still personal, even if the mistakes are institutional. It 
attaches to the president, not to the system or some diffuse collection of other officials. 
Constitutional character shifts the focus away from individual responsibility for committing 
primary offenses to individual responsibility for failing to oversee the institutional practices 
and subordinate officials that permit those offenses. This shift of focus requires a modified 
concept of individual responsibility, with a somewhat broader reach than is common in 
private life. Constitutional character calls for a sense of responsibility that results in effective 
actions before and after its “taking.” The actions include, if not the resignation of the 
president, then the dismissal of high level subordinates, a thorough investigation by 
independent monitors, and significant institutional reforms to prevent similar mistakes in the 
future.  
The concept also requires a shift of emphasis in the objects of responsibility—what 
the president believes he is responsible for. These should include: (1) acts of omission as 
much as for acts of commission; (2) gross negligence as much as for intentional 
wrongdoing; (3) offenses of oversight as much as for the primary offenses over which the   12 
oversight is exercised; and (4) inappropriately trusting friends and colleagues as much as 
for mistakenly trusting enemies and rivals. In general, a constitutional sense of responsibility 
focuses less on the vices and virtues of personal decision making (greed or honesty, for 
example), and more on the vices and virtues of the institutional overseeing (carelessness or 
vigilance, for example). Watchfulness is as important as righteousness in the constitutional 
character of presidents.  
 
Tolerance of Opposition 
An essential prerequisite of the democratic process is the existence of a vigorous 
opposition (Dahl 1972), which in turn requires a disposition to tolerate political opponents. 
This tolerance supports the capacity of the democratic process to promote necessary 
compromise and accommodation. It is acutely impaired by extreme partisanship and 
political polarization of the kind that has marked national politics in the US in recent years.   
  Political tolerance does not of course mean that you cannot criticize, work against, 
shun or politically punish your rivals. But it does mean that you must engage them in the 
political process on fair terms, rather than trying to eliminate them by concocting 
conspiracies in the backrooms or fomenting violence on the streets. The attitude or 
character underlying this kind of political tolerance more positively requires that citizens 
genuinely believe that their opponents should have full rights to participate in the political 
process.  It goes beyond mere tolerance, beyond the attitude of forbearance that citizens 
are expected to adopt in a healthy civil society. In its strongest form, political tolerance calls 
on leaders actively to seek opportunities for cooperation with their opponents. In partisan 
politics, that may mean practicing more bipartisanship than they might otherwise prefer.    13 
Until recently, political scientists have paid more attention to attitudes of tolerance in 
citizens rather than in leaders (Sullivan et al 1993). But as American politics has become 
increasingly polarized, they have begun to study the rise of extreme partisanship among 
political elites. (Bond and Fleisher 2000; Fiorina 2006; McCarty et al 2006). Although the 
conclusion is still controversial, it appears that a major if not the main cause of polarization 
is to be found more among the political elites than among ordinary citizens. In any case, 
presidents certainly set the tone for their administration, and to some extent also for the 
polity. If they display a politically intolerant disposition, they are more likely to inspire a 
politics of enmity and obstruction. If they manifest a more tolerant character, they are more 
likely to encourage civility and cooperation.  
The contrast between Nixon and Reagan in this respect is striking. Whether Nixon 
knew in advance about the notorious enemies’ list (part of his campaign’s “Political 
Enemies Project”), it expressed accurately enough his own attitude toward political 
opponents. The original list included 20 names of opponents whom his aide Charles 
Colson identified as potential targets for governmental harassment, which included ordering 
unwarranted tax audits, and manipulating “grant availability, federal contracts, litigation, 
prosecution, etc.”).  White House counsel John Dean described its purpose at the time:  
“This memorandum addresses the matter of how we can maximize the fact of our 
incumbency in dealing with persons known to be active in their opposition to our 
Administration; stated a bit more bluntly—how we can use the available federal 
machinery to screw our political enemies” (Dean, 1971). 
Reagan conveyed a quite different attitude. The public policies he supported were 
probably less accommodating and more ideological than Nixon’s but his political style was 
much more conciliatory. Reagan was “more a conciliator than a reformer” (Troy 2005, 18-  14 
19). “Although passionate—at times too passionate—in fighting for what he believed in, 
Reagan was a leader who understood American politics, and who, with the egregious 
exception of Iran-contra, practiced the art of compromise shrewdly” (Wilentz 2008, 286). 
After Iran-contra, Reagan brought in a new chief of staff, Howard Baker, known as the 
great conciliator—in signal contrast to Nixon’s H.R. Haldeman, the “quintessential hatchet 
man” (Liebovich 2003, 3).  
By the mid 1990s the increasingly polarized politics made it difficult for any 
president, whatever his disposition, to show much forbearance toward his political 
opponents. Clinton may have had an inclination toward compromise (Wilentz 2008, 326 ) 
but it was set aside in face of what he and his wife saw as a “vast right wing conspiracy” 
organized by his political enemies. Bush may have intended to be a “uniter, not a divider.” 
As a candidate, he promised to stand against the “politics of pitting one group of people 
against another, the politics of pointing fingers” and in favor the “politics advocated by … 
Ronald Reagan, who was a uniter” (CNN 2000). But he surrounded himself with advisers 
like Karl Rove who keenly embraced polarization as a deliberate political strategy.  
Obama came into office with a record of reaching across the aisle in the Illinois 
senate and briefly in the U.S. Senate, and with promises of promoting a new bipartisanship 
in Washington.  His early efforts met with mixed success at best, but he persisted. “When I 
made a series of overtures to the Republicans …all those were not designed simply to get 
some short-term votes. They were designed to try to build up some trust over time … as I 
continue to make these overtures, over time, hopefully that will be reciprocated …And 
hopefully the tone that I’ve taken, which has been consistently civil and respectful, will pay 
some dividends over the long term” (Federal News Service 2009).  His chief of staff, Rahm 
Emanuel, offered what might be regarded as a more strategic interpretation of the   15 
administration’s efforts: “The public wants bipartisanship…We just have to try. We don’t 
have to succeed” (Lizza 2009). But Emanuel’s main point was that a president cannot 
achieve bipartisanship alone: “I don’t think the onus is on us. We tried. The story is they 
[the Republicans] failed.”  
Whether that is the full story is no doubt subject to partisan dispute, but the need 
for reciprocity in the pursuit of bipartisanship should not be.  Even a president inclined 
toward cooperation cannot succeed unless his opponents respond in kind. Moreover, the 
leaders and members of his own party in Congress must share his attitude. His own party’s 
partisans are often a major obstacle to depolarization. The character of the president is 
obviously not the only protection against the politics of polarization, but his habits of mind 
and those of the officials he appoints are a significant source of the support for (or 
impediment to) the attitudes of political toleration on which a healthy democratic process 
depends.  
 
Willingness to Justify Decisions 
Presidents are usually all too ready to justify their decisions—on their own terms. With the 
help of press secretaries, political surrogates, information campaigns, spin doctors and 
other techniques of modern public relations, their justifications are sometimes 
indistinguishable from propaganda. The kind of justification required by constitutional 
character is quite different. It calls for a good faith effort to give reasons and respond to 
reasons others give. This is the process of mutual justification that contemporary 
deliberative democrats have made the core of their conception of democracy but one that 
democrats of many stripes have long held as an ideal (Gutmann and Thompson 2004). The 
moral basis for this reason-giving process is that citizens should be treated not only as   16 
objects of legislation, as passive subjects to be ruled, but as autonomous agents who take 
part in the governance of their society, directly or through their representatives. In a 
democracy an important way they take part is by presenting and responding to reasons, or 
demanding that their representatives do so, with the aim of justifying the laws under which 
they must live together.  
This justificatory requirement has several practical implications for the exercise of 
constitutional character. First, the president should regularly face his critics in public 
settings that permit a genuine give and take. Press conferences are not ideal, but they are 
better than nothing (Clayman et al 2006; and Kumar 2005).  Yet since Truman’s presidency 
there has been a significant decline in the frequency of press conferences 
(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/newsconferences.php). Both Bushes held more 
than Clinton, but the events were widely considered even less informative.  Debates have 
their deficiencies too, but they allow for more sustained dialogue. If they have value when 
candidates are campaigning, might they not also have value when presidents are 
governing? The practice of regular debates could be carried over from the campaign to the 
presidency—not with the same opponents of course but perhaps with leaders in Congress 
serving as the challengers.  
A second implication is that the justifications should be accessible. A deliberative 
justification does not even get started if those to whom it addressed cannot understand its 
essential content. Appeals to abstruse scientific studies or complex economic theories 
should not substitute for a good faith attempt to explain the fundamental rationale of a 
policy. Nor would it be acceptable to appeal only to the authority of revelation, whether 
divine or secular in nature. Most of the Bush’s arguments for going to war against Iraq 
appealed to evidence and beliefs that almost anyone could assess. Although Bush implied   17 
that he thought God was on our side, he did not rest his argument on any special 
instructions from his heavenly ally (who may or may not have joined the coalition of the 
willing).  
The example of the controversy about the Iraq war suggests a third implication: the 
justification should not depend mainly on secret evidence. It is usually possible to have a 
substantive debate even about decisions involving national security without revealing 
sources and methods of intelligence and other critical information that are legitimately kept 
secret. In the case of Iraq, it was not the need for secrecy that prevented the administration 
from presenting a compelling justification. It was, as we later learned, the weakness of the 
evidence itself. (To the extent that the justification was deceptive, it revealed another 
character defect, the lack of candor, discussed below.) The partial secrecy and presumed 
deception made it difficult for citizens adequately to dispute the decision to go to war at the 
time (though some tried hard).  The reasons the administration gave were effectively 
challenged later, and they were found to be wanting. The democratic process would have 
been better served if the reasons could have been challenged earlier. Leaders with 
constitutional character do not evade early challenges. 
A final implication is that the reason-giving should be on-going. It should be part of 
a dynamic process that does not necessarily end when the initial decision is made. 
Argument about the decision to go to war in Iraq went on for a long time, longer than most 
preparations for war. But even after the decision was made, the argument continued. It 
was then not about whether to go to war but whether the decision to go to war was 
justified (and if so whether for the right reasons). The critics could not undo the decision but 
they hoped to influence future decisions—to press for involving the UN and other nations in 
the reconstruction effort, to bring the war to a more rapid conclusion, or simply to weaken   18 
the Republican’s prospects for re-election. Even when motives are partisan, a president 
with constitutional character does not shrink from confronting his critics—and in public 
forums that allow for genuine exchange of views. On matters of war and peace, that kind of 
dialogue is difficult to promote, but it is all the more important. 
The point of recognizing that the process is on-going would be lost if presidents did 
not leave open the possibility of changing their mind. Not only should they be prepared to 
learn new facts, but they should also stand ready to revise their views in response to good 
arguments others make. The importance of this openness to change is too often obscured 
by the insistence on another, commonly overrated personal virtue—constancy or 
steadfastness. To be sure, we do not want presidents who pander to public opinion, who 
govern mainly by reference to focus groups. But neither do we want presidents who ignore 
changing circumstances, disconcerting facts, or widespread opinion that is stable and well 
informed. Fidelity to core principles is to be admired, but constancy in the face of evidence 
of error is to be suspected. Steadfastness can too readily turn into stubbornness.  
That is why the charge of flip flopping, so prevalent in recent campaigns, distorts 
the appraisal of candidates. The mere fact that a candidate has changed his position may 
be a cause more for praise rather than for censure, whether or not the shift is to his 
electoral advantage. The question should be whether his new view is justified, whether 
changing circumstances (fresh evidence or better arguments) warrant the change, 
whatever his motives might be. Answering that question is harder than merely pointing out 
inconsistencies, and would require pundits to look more deeply into the merits of the issue 
in question. A president with constitutional character is not afraid to change his mind.  The 
constant commitment should be to taking positions on the basis of the best available   19 
evidence and advice at the time, and justifying any necessary changes on the same 
basis—without fear of being branded a flip-flopper.  
 
Commitment to Candor 
In Dante’s Inferno, liars end up in the penultimate circle of hell, even deeper in Hell than 
those who have perpetrated violence. Deceit is an especially diabolical vice because its 
victims often do not know they are victims. They cannot take steps to protect themselves 
from the other evils that may be visited upon them. This is even more true in government. 
Deception undermines democratic government. It is so destructive because it enables 
governments to commit other wrongs with impunity. We cannot hold officials accountable 
for their other vices and other misconduct if they deceive us about what they are doing. 
Candor is therefore the pre-eminent virtue of the democratic process because it is the pre-
requisite for knowing what other virtues (and vices) the president and his associates have.  
Even with respect to this preeminent virtue, we should still be selective in what we 
require of leaders. One reason to be discriminating is that presidential deception is 
occasionally justified. Constitutional character does not abjure it absolutely but includes the 
capacity to discern when it is and when it is not justified. At a press conference in 
November 1962 shortly after the Cuban missile crisis had passed, Kennedy was arguably 
justified in denying that any matters other than Cuba had been discussed in negotiations 
with Soviet officials. Kennedy had privately promised Khrushchev that if the Soviets 
withdrew their missiles, the U.S. would remove its missiles from Turkey. But a full report on 
the negotiations, candid enough to persuade Americans, could have unsettled our Turkish 
allies, and undermined Khrushchev’s precarious position with his suspicious colleagues, 
reigniting the crisis. (Allison 1971, but see Alter 2005).    20 
To be justified, official deception must satisfy stringent conditions.  It should be in 
the service of a goal that is widely acceptable (not merely in the political interest of the 
president and his party). There should be no reasonable alternative means of achieving the 
goal (such as saying only “no comment”). It should be an isolated incident rather than part 
of a permanent practice (a one time crisis rather than a continuing routine). If the deception 
is not of a type that could be approved in advance (such as sting operations by law 
enforcement agents), the officials should ensure that it can be reviewed later.  Because 
these conditions are difficult to satisfy, even well-intentioned leaders are tempted to ignore 
them. That suggests that constitutional character should tilt toward candor.  We should 
worry less that a president will be too pure to get his hands dirty than that he will when he 
should not.  
Kennedy’s deception may have satisfied the first three conditions, but falls short on 
the fourth. Neither the deception nor the agreement that it concealed was made public until 
years after the need for secrecy had passed. The President’s advisers reported the episode 
publicly for the first time in a magazine article in 1972 —long after they and their party had 
left office. The first public statement by those who participated in the decision making 
during the crisis came in 1982 (“Lessons…” 1982, 85-86). Because of the delay, citizens 
could not effectively sanction those who made the decisions or those who engaged in the 
deception, and could not call for timely measures to change how officials might conduct 
themselves in similar crises in the future. In those limited circumstances in which deception 
is justified, presidents should reveal the deception as soon as the end that justified it has 
been accomplished and no further equally important ends would be defeated by the 
revelation. If constitutional character includes the discretion to deceive, it also implies a duty   21 
to disclose the deception. The license to deceive expires sooner than most presidents are 
inclined to assume.  
Even among the deceptions that are not justified, some are worse than others. 
Candor itself is not a unified virtue. Several years ago a team of magazine researchers 
compiled a list of lies spoken by the last four presidents, and asked a panel of noted 
pundits and journalists to rate each lie, and give an overall score to each president. 
(Washington Monthly 2003). The subhead asked: “Which president told the biggest 
whoppers?” The answer —George W. Bush— evidently did not surprise most readers. The 
more interesting fact was that there was not that much difference in the overall scores of 
the four presidents: most received about a 3 on a scale of 5. All our presidents are liars, the 
implication seemed to be. A cover story in Atlantic Monthly by a veteran White House 
reporter later came to the same conclusion. “From Washington to FDR to Nixon, presidents 
have always lied” (though again GWB is deemed worse than most) (Cannon 2005).  
Even if all presidents are equally liars, which is doubtful, not all lies are created 
equal. The experts on the lie-rating panel were usually able to distinguish the trivial from the 
significant. Clinton’s claim to have heard about the Iowa caucuses since he was a “little 
boy” though they did not exist until he was much older was deemed less serious than his 
notorious “I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky.” Even so, 
catalogs of this kind do not reveal much about character because they do not tell us much 
about the content of the lie, the consequences it might have for public policy, and the likely 
effects on the intended audience. And they often confuse lies with other kinds of failures. 
GHW Bush’s defense of his decision to appoint Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court 
(“…he is the best qualified at this time. I kept my word … by picking the best man for the 
job on the merits”) shows less an ethical flaw than a failure of judgment.    22 
This preoccupation with individual lies is problematic in several ways. Most 
seriously, it distracts us from attending to more insidious forms of concealment, especially 
institutional deception with which constitutional character should be principally concerned. 
Hunting mainly for individual lies merely reinforces the common tendency to worry more 
about the more familiar personal vices of private life than about the less appreciated 
institutional vices of public life. Consider Ronald Reagan’s statement in November 1986 
defending the administration’s actions in the Iran-contra affair:  
“We did not—repeat, did not—trade weapons or anything else for hostages, nor 
will we” (Reagan 1986). 
Reagan was probably sincere. He was not lying, strictly speaking. He was inattentive, some 
would say, but he was not unethical, or at least not as unethical as Oliver North and 
Admiral Poindexter, both of whom evidently did lie.  But this charitable view ignores 
Reagan’s failure to take real responsibility for allowing or even creating conditions that 
encouraged others to lie and deceive. For a President that may be an even worse vice, as 
far as constitutional character is concerned. Explicit presidential lies are usually soon 
exposed, but the lies of subordinates and deceptive practices are harder to detect and are 
therefore more pernicious.  
Beyond deception, constitutional character needs to be steeled against the other 
vices of concealment—most notably, secrecy and manipulation—which can distort the 
democratic process no less (Thompson 1987). In modern government, secrecy in particular 
has a tendency to expand well beyond its legitimate limits. A presidential commitment to 
transparency may be one of the few checks on this excessive expansion. If allowed to 
spread, its effects can amplify the damage of deception. Secrecy can block inquiries into   23 
past deceptions. If citizens do not know whether they have been deceived, they cannot 
take measures to prevent similar deception in the future.  
Thus the qualities we should require —as distinct from those we might hope for— 
do not include many of the virtues we prize in private life. But they do include all of the 
constitutional virtues —and above all candor. A candid president not only tells the truth, but 
encourages his subordinates to be truthful (when the public good requires the truth). Only 
when the president has this virtue can we as citizens judge whether he possesses the other 
qualities of constitutional character that we should demand in our political leaders.   24 
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